Examining market power in the European natural gas market

被引:86
作者
Egging, Rudolf G.
Gabriel, Steven A. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Maryland, Dept Civil & Environm Engn, Appl Math & Sci Computat Program, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
[2] Energy Res Ctr Netherlands, Policy Studies Grp, NL-1031 CM Amsterdam, Netherlands
关键词
European gas market equilibrium; complementary model; gas market policies;
D O I
10.1016/j.enpol.2005.04.018
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In this paper, we develop a mixed complementarity equilibrium model for the European natural gas market. This model has producers as Cournot players with conjectured supply functions relative to their rivals. As such, these producers can withhold production to increase downstream prices for greater profits. The other players are taken to be perfectly competitive and are combined with extensive pipeline, seasonal, and other data reflecting the current state of the market. Four market scenarios are run to analyze the extent of market power by these producers as well as the importance of pipeline and storage capacity. (c) 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:2762 / 2778
页数:17
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