Matching and price competition

被引：73

作者：

Bulow, J ^{[1
]}

Levin, J

机构：

[1] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

[2] Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2006年 / 96卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/aer.96.3.652

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We develop a model in which firms set impersonal salary levels before matching with workers. Wages fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise almost as much, implying little inefficiency. Furthermore, the best firms gain the most from the system while wages become compressed. In light of our results, we discuss the performance of alternative institutions and the recent antitrust case against the National Resident Matching Program.

引用

页码：652 / 668

页数：17

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