Rating banks: Risk and uncertainty in an opaque industry

被引:486
作者
Morgan, DP [1 ]
机构
[1] Fed Reserve Bank New York, New York, NY 10045 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/00028280260344506
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The pattern of disagreement between bond raters suggests that banks and insurance firms are inherently more opaque than other types of firms. Moody's and S&P split more often over these financial intermediaries, and the splits are more lopsided, as theory here predicts. Uncertainty over the banks stems from certain assets, loans and trading assets in particular, the risks of which are hard to observe or easy to change. Banks' high leverage, which invites agency problems, compounds the uncertainty over their assets. These findings bear on both the existence and reform of bank regulation.
引用
收藏
页码:874 / 888
页数:15
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