Using programmer-written compiler extensions to catch security holes

被引：53

作者：

Ashcraft, K ^{[1
]}

Engler, D ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Stanford Univ, Comp Syst Lab, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

来源：

2002 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY, PROCEEDINGS | 2002年

关键词：

D O I：

10.1109/SECPRI.2002.1004368

中图分类号：

TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

This paper shows how system-specific static analysis can find security errors that violate rules such as "integers from untrusted sources must be sanitized before use" and "do not dereference user-supplied pointers." In our approach, programmers write system-specific extensions that are linked into the compiler and check their code for errors. We demonstrate the approach's effectiveness by using it to find over 100 security errors in Linux and OpenBSD, over 50 of which have led to kernel patches. An unusual feature of our approach is the use of methods to automatically detect when we miss code actions that should be checked.

引用

页码：143 / 159

页数：17