Self-securing ad hoc wireless networks

Mobile ad hoc networking offers convenient infrastructureless communication over the shared wireless channel. However, the nature of ad hoc networks makes them vulnerable to security attacks. Examples of such attacks include passive eavesdropping over the wireless channel, denial of service attacks by malicious nodes and attacks from compromised nodes or stolen devices. Unlike their wired counterpart, infrastructureless ad hoc networks do not have a clear line of defense, and every node must be prepared for encounters with an adversary. Therefore, a centralized or hierarchical network security solution does not work well. This work provides scalable, distributed authentication services in ad hoc networks. Our design takes a self-securing approach, in which multiple nodes (say, k) collaboratively provide authentication services for other nodes in the network. We first formalize a localized trust model that lays the foundation for the design. We further propose refined localized certification services based on our previous work, and develop a new scalable share update to resist more powerful adversaries. Finally, we evaluate the solution through simulation and implementation.