Changing social norms - Common property, bridewealth, and clan exogamy

Much has been written on change in social norms, but with few exceptions such efforts have failed to synthesize the growing theoretical literature with the specifics of empirical cases. Attempting such a synthesis, we develop a theoretical framework for explaining norm emergence and change that builds on Earth's idea of generative models. We identify three mechanisms offered in the contemporary theoretical literature to account for the dynamic process of norm change: (1) coordination on focal-points, (2) competitive selection among contracts, and (3) bargaining. We investigate three examples of norm change among the Galole Orma-common property rights, bridewealth, and clan exogamy-and show that examination of strategic decision making within the constraints presented by social context can produce adequate accounts of such change. We conclude that the primary mechanism in norm change among the Orma is bargaining and that the most important sources of such change are asymmetries in bargaining power.