Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion

被引：188

作者：

Gilo, David ^{[1
]}

Moshe, Yossi

Spiegel, Yossi

机构：

[1] Tel Aviv Univ, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel

[2] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, IL-84105 Beer Sheva, Israel

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 2006年 / 37卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00005.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We examine the effects that passive investments in rival firms have on the incentives of firms to engage in tacit collusion. In general, these incentives depend in a complex way on the entire partial cross ownership (PCO) structure in the industry. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions for PCO arrangements to facilitate tacit collusion and also examine how tacit collusion is affected when firms' controllers make direct passive investments in rival firms.

引用

页码：81 / 99

页数：19

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