Sharing Storage in a Smart Grid: A Coalitional Game Approach

被引:209
作者
Chakraborty, Pratyush [1 ]
Baeyens, Enrique [2 ]
Poolla, Kameshwar [3 ]
Khargonekar, Pramod P. [4 ]
Varaiya, Pravin [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Mech Engn, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
[2] Univ Valladolid, Inst Tecnol Avanzadas Prod, E-47011 Valladolid, Spain
[3] Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Elect Engn & Comp Sci, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
[4] Univ Calif Irvine, Dept Elect Engn & Comp Sci, Irvine, CA 92697 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会; 新加坡国家研究基金会;
关键词
Storage sharing; cooperative game theory; cost allocation; ECONOMIC VIABILITY; DEMAND; CONSUMPTION; ARBITRAGE; PRICE; TIME;
D O I
10.1109/TSG.2018.2858206
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
080906 [电磁信息功能材料与结构]; 082806 [农业信息与电气工程];
摘要
Sharing economy is a transformative socio-economic phenomenon built around the idea of sharing underused resources and services, e.g., transportation and housing, thereby reducing costs and extracting value. Anticipating continued reduction in the cost of electricity storage, we look into the potential opportunity in electrical power system where consumers share storage with each other. We consider two different scenarios. In the first scenario, consumers are assumed to already have individual storage devices and they explore cooperation to minimize the realized electricity consumption cost. In the second scenario, a group of consumers is interested to invest in joint storage capacity and operate it cooperatively. The resulting system problems are modeled using cooperative game theory. In both cases, the cooperative games are shown to have non-empty cores and we develop efficient cost allocations in the core with analytical expressions. Thus, sharing of storage in cooperative manner is shown to be very effective for the electric power system.
引用
收藏
页码:4379 / 4390
页数:12
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