Information congestion

被引:45
作者
Anderson, Simon P. [1 ]
de Palma, Andre [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22903 USA
[2] Ecole Normale Super, Cachan, France
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
WELFARE; SEARCH; MODEL; RECEIVER; OVERLOAD; MARKETS; NUMBER; PRICES;
D O I
10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00085.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Unsolicited advertising messages vie for scarce attention. "Junk" mail, "spam" e-mail, and telemarketing calls need both parties to exert effort to generate transactions. Message receivers supply attention according to average message benefit, while the marginal sender determines congestion. Costlier transmission may improve average message benefit so more messages are examined. Too many (too few) messages may be sent, or the wrong ones. A Do-Not-Call policy beats a ban, but too many individuals opt out. A monopoly gatekeeper performs better than personal access pricing if nuisance costs to receivers are moderate. The welfare results still hold when messages are presorted (triage).
引用
收藏
页码:688 / 709
页数:22
相关论文
共 31 条
[1]  
ANDERSON S, 2007, SHOUTING BE HE UNPUB
[2]  
ANDERSON S, 2009, COMPETITION AT UNPUB
[3]  
ANDERSON S, 2008, TIVOED EFFECTS UNPUB
[4]   Pricing, product diversity, and search costs: a Bertrand-Chamberlin-Diamond model [J].
Anderson, SP ;
Renault, R .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1999, 30 (04) :719-735
[5]   Market provision of broadcasting: A welfare analysis [J].
Anderson, SP ;
Coate, S .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2005, 72 (04) :947-972
[6]  
[Anonymous], 2007, HDB IND ORG
[7]  
[Anonymous], REV ECON STUD
[8]   Competition in two-sided markets [J].
Armstrong, Mark .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2006, 37 (03) :668-691
[9]  
AYRES I, 2003, WALL STREET J 1008
[10]  
BAYE M, 2007, BRAND PRICE AD UNPUB