Executive stock options: Early exercise provisions and risk-taking incentives

被引:50
作者
Brisley, Neil [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Western Ontario, Richard Ivey Sch Business, London, ON N6A 3K7, Canada
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01064.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Traditional executive stock option plans allow fixed numbers of options to vest peri-odically, independent of stock price performance. Because such options may climb deep in-the-money long before the manager can exercise them, they can exacerbate risk aversion in project selection. Making the proportion of options that vest a gradually increasing function of the stock price can ensure that appropriate numbers of options are retained while they provide risk-taking incentives, but are exercised once they have lost their convexity. "Progressive performance vesting" can allow the firm more efficiently to rebalance the manager's risk-taking incentives.
引用
收藏
页码:2487 / 2509
页数:23
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