Bargaining in competing supply chains with uncertainty

Substantial literature has been devoted to supply chain coordination. The majority of this literature ignores competition between supply chains. Moreover, a significant part of this literature focuses on coordination that induce the supply chain members to follow strategies that produce the equilibria chosen by a vertically integrated supply chain. This paper investigates the equilibrium behavior of two competing supply chains in the presence of demand uncertainty. We consider joint pricing and quantity decisions and competition under three possible supply chain strategies: Vertical Integration (VI), Manufacturer's Stackelberg (MS), and Bargaining on the Wholesale price (BW(alpha), alpha is the bargaining parameter) over a single or infinitely many periods. We show that, in contrast to earlier literature, using VIVI (VI in both chains) is the unique Nash Equilibrium over one period decision, while using MSMS or BW(alpha)BW(alpha) may be Nash Equilibrium over infinitely many periods. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.