Permits, standards, and technology innovation

被引:193
作者
Montero, JP
机构
[1] MIT, Alfred P Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
[2] Catholic Univ Chile, Santiago, Chile
关键词
tradeable permits; standards; technology innovation; oligopoly markets;
D O I
10.1006/jeem.2001.1194
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
I compare environmental R&D incentives offered by four policy instruments-emission standards, performance standards, tradeable permits, and auctioned permits-in the presence of oligopoly permits and output markets. Because R&D incentives depend on direct and strategic effects, standards can offer greater incentives than do permits. If markets are perfectly competitive, however, tradeable and auctioned permits provide equal incentives that are similar to those offered by emission standards and greater than those offered by performance standards. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).
引用
收藏
页码:23 / 44
页数:22
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