Lost injury days: Moral hazard differences between tort and workers' compensation

被引:11
作者
Butler, RJ
机构
[1] Department of Insurance, Industrial Relations Center
关键词
D O I
10.2307/253619
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Texas is one of only three states where employers can opt out of workers' compensation, and the only state where a substantial number of employers choose to do so (44 percent). This article compares the lost injury day patterns of firms opting out of workers' compensation with those choosing to maintain a workers' compensation program. Support is found for the hypothesis that differences in reported lost work days partially reflect differences in moral hazard reporting incentives: in the opt-out sector, there are slightly higher injury rates, shorter lost work day durations, and fewer sprains and strains reported than in the workers' compensation sector.
引用
收藏
页码:405 / 433
页数:29
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