Executive compensation: Six questions that need answering

被引：93

作者：

Abowd, JM ^{[1
]}

Kaplan, DS

机构：

[1] Cornell Univ, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA

[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[3] Ctr Rech Econ & Stat, Paris, France

[4] US Bur Labor Stat, Washington, DC 20212 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES | 1999年 / 13卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/jep.13.4.145

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This article address six questions concerning executive compensation, drawing on recent advances in the study of executive compensation, including the role of stock and option holdings: How much does executive compensation cost the firm? How much is executive compensation worth to the recipient? How well does executive compensation work? What are the effects of executive compensation? How much executive compensation is enough? Could executive compensation be improved? Our discussion will focus on the role of agency theory, which predicts that stock-based compensation will align executive and shareholder interests by linking the executive's compensation directly to increases in the market value of the company.

引用

页码：145 / 168

页数：24

共 43 条

[1] DOES PERFORMANCE-BASED MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION AFFECT CORPORATE PERFORMANCE [J].