Using field experiments to test equivalence between auction formats: Magic on the Internet

被引:203
作者
Lucking-Reiley, D [1 ]
机构
[1] Vanderbilt Univ, Dept Econ, Nashville, TN 37235 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/aer.89.5.1063
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
William Vickrey's predicted equivalences between first-price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions, and between second-price sealed-bid and English auctions, are tested using field experiments that auctioned off collectible trading cards over the Internet. The results indicate that the Dutch auction produces 30-percent higher revenues than the first-price auction format, a violation of the theoretical prediction and a reversal of previous laboratory results, and that the English and second-price formats produce roughly equivalent revenues. (JEL C93, D44).
引用
收藏
页码:1063 / 1080
页数:18
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