Sequential auctions with synergies: An example

被引:33
作者
Branco, F
机构
关键词
sequential auctions; declining price anomaly;
D O I
10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00013-X
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
An equilibrium in an example of a two unit sequential ascending price auction where some bidders have superadditive values is presented. The equilibrium is in pure strategies. In equilibrium the expected price declines from the first to the second auction.
引用
收藏
页码:159 / 163
页数:5
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