Information and preference aggregation

被引：24

作者：

Campbell, DE ^{[1
]}

Kelly, JS

机构：

[1] Coll William & Mary, Dept Econ, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA

[2] Syracuse Univ, Dept Econ, Syracuse, NY 13244 USA

来源：

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | 2000年 / 17卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/PL00007172

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We investigate the implications of relaxing Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom while retaining transitivity and the Pareto condition. Even a small relaxation opens a floodgate of possibilities for nondictatorial and efficient social choice.

引用

页码：3 / 24

页数：22

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