The fit between CEO compensation design and firm risk

被引：168

作者：

Miller, JS ^{[1
]}

Wiseman, RM

Gomez-Mejia, LR

机构：

[1] Univ Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI 53201 USA

[2] Michigan State Univ, Eli Broad Coll Business, E Lansing, MI 48824 USA

[3] Arizona State Univ, Coll Business, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA

来源：

ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL | 2002年 / 45卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.5465/3069308

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We examined the effects of unsystematic and systematic firm risk on CEO compensation risk bearing and total pay. Both the proportion of variable pay in CEO pay packages and their magnitude are curvilinearly related to unsystematic firm risk-that is, they are highest under conditions of moderate firm-specific risk. Our results are consistent with agency theory predictions that both performance-contingent pay and the greater earnings potential associated with that form of pay are highest when an agent has greater control over performance outcomes.

引用

页码：745 / 756

页数：12

共 43 条

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