Product market competition and conditional conservatism

被引:116
作者
Dhaliwal, Dan [1 ]
Huang, Shawn [2 ]
Khurana, Inder K. [3 ]
Pereira, Raynolde [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Arizona, Eller Coll Management, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
[2] Arizona State Univ, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA
[3] Univ Missouri, Robert J Trulaske Sr Coll Business, Columbia, MO 65211 USA
关键词
Market structure; Firm strategy; Monopoly rents; Political costs; AUDITOR INDUSTRY EXPERTISE; ASYMMETRIC TIMELINESS; UNCONDITIONAL CONSERVATISM; DISTRIBUTIONAL PROPERTIES; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; TO-BOOK; EARNINGS; INCENTIVES; GOVERNANCE; COMPUSTAT;
D O I
10.1007/s11142-013-9267-2
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Based on pooled cross-sectional analysis, we find a robust positive relation between product market competition and conditional accounting conservatism. We also find evidence of an inter-temporal increase in conditional conservatism following industry deregulation and increased antitrust case filings. Distinguishing further between two dimensions of competition, we find conditional conservatism is greater when there is a higher threat of new entrants as well as stiff existing competition. Moreover, we find these results largely hold for industry followers as opposed to industry leaders, suggesting that strategic considerations shape the extent to which product market competition affects conditional conservatism.
引用
收藏
页码:1309 / 1345
页数:37
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