Fairness as a constraint on trust in reciprocity: earned property rights in a reciprocal exchange experiment

被引:67
作者
Fahr, R
Irlenbusch, B
机构
[1] Univ Bonn, Lab Expt Wirtschaftsforsch, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
[2] Univ Bonn, Bonn Grad Sch Econ, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
关键词
mindreading; fairness; trust; reciprocity; property rights; real effort; experiments;
D O I
10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00236-0
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We investigate the concept of mindreading in a trust-reciprocity experiment. Our results show that the Trustees send back more, the stronger the Trusters' property rights are. But instead of strategically relying on this reciprocal behavior, Trusters tend to unilaterally implement a fair outcome. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C70; C78; C91; D63.
引用
收藏
页码:275 / 282
页数:8
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