Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value?

被引:721
作者
Goldman, Eitan [1 ]
Rocholl, Joerg [2 ]
So, Jongil [3 ]
机构
[1] Indiana Univ, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA
[2] ESMT European Sch Management & Technol Berlin, Berlin, Germany
[3] Univ N Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC USA
关键词
G30; G34; G38; DIRECTORS; BUSY;
D O I
10.1093/rfs/hhn088
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This article explores whether political connections are important in the United States. The article uses an original hand-collected data set on the political connections of board members of S&P 500 companies to sort companies into those connected to the Republican Party and those connected to the Democratic Party. The analysis shows a positive abnormal stock return following the announcement of the nomination of a politically connected individual to the board. This article also analyzes the stock-price response to the Republican win of the 2000 presidential election and finds that companies connected to the Republican Party increase in value, and companies connected to the Democratic Party decrease in value.
引用
收藏
页码:2331 / 2360
页数:30
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