Learning from Enron

被引:35
作者
Deakin, S
Konzelmann, SJ
机构
[1] Univ Cambridge, Judge Inst Management, Ctr Business Res, Cambridge CB2 1AG, England
[2] Univ London Birkbeck Coll, Sch Management & Org Psychol, Clore Management Ctr, London WC1E 7HX, England
关键词
Enron; corporate governance; shareholder value; non-executive directors; monitoring board;
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-8683.2004.00352.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper argues that the Enron affair has been misunderstood as a failure of monitoring, with adverse consequences for the drafting of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Higgs report. Where Enron's board failed was in misunderstanding the risks which were inherent in the company's business plan and failing to implement an effective system of internal control. Enron demonstrates the limits of the monitoring board and points the way to a stewardship model in which the board takes responsibility for ensuring the sustainability of the company's assets over time.
引用
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页码:134 / 142
页数:9
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