AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF PATENT HOLDUP

被引：31

作者：

Galetovic, Alexander ^{[1
]}

Haber, Stephen ^{[2
]}

Levine, Ross ^{[3
,4
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Los Andes, Santiago, Chile

[2] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

[3] Univ Calif Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA

[4] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS | 2015年 / 11卷 / 03期

关键词：

ROYALTY STACKING; TROLLS; FRAND; COST;

D O I：

10.1093/joclec/nhv024

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A large theoretical literature asserts that standard-essential patents (SEPs) allow their owners to "hold up" innovation by charging fees that exceed their incremental contribution to a final product. We evaluate two central, interrelated predictions of this SEP holdup hypothesis: (1) SEP-reliant industries should experience more stagnant quality-adjusted prices than non-SEP-reliant industries; and (2) court decisions that reduce the excessive power of SEP holders should accelerate innovation in SEP-reliant industries. We find no empirical support for either prediction. Indeed, SEP-reliant industries have the fastest quality-adjusted price declines in the U.S. economy.

引用

页码：549 / 578

页数：30

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