On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall

被引:163
作者
Piccione, M [1 ]
Rubinstein, A [1 ]
机构
[1] TEL AVIV UNIV,SCH ECON,IL-69978 TEL AVIV,ISRAEL
关键词
D O I
10.1006/game.1997.0536
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We argue that in extensive decision problems (extensive games with a single player) with imperfect recall care must be taken in interpreting information sets and strategies. Alternative interpretations allow for different kinds of analysis. We address the following issues: 1. randomization at information sets; 2. consistent beliefs; 3. time consistency of optimal plans; 4. the multiselves approach to decision making. We illustrate our discussion through an example that we call the ''paradox of the absentminded driver.'' Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, DO. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:3 / 24
页数:22
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