Managerial discipline and corporate restructuring following performance declines

被引:163
作者
Denis, DJ [1 ]
Kruse, TA
机构
[1] Purdue Univ, Krannert Grad Sch Management, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA
[2] Loyola Univ, Sch Business Adm, Chicago, IL 60611 USA
关键词
management turnover; takeovers; restructuring;
D O I
10.1016/S0304-405X(99)00055-0
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine the incidence of disciplinary events that reduce the control of current managers, and corporate restructuring among firms experiencing a large decline in operating performance during an active takeover period (1985-1988) and a less active period (1989-1992). We document a significant decline in the disciplinary events from the active to the less active period that is driven by a significant decline in disciplinary takeovers, those takeovers that result in a top executive change. Following the performance decline, however, there is a substantial amount of corporate restructuring, and a significant improvement in operating performance, during both the active and the less active takeover period. We conclude that, although some managerial disciplinary events are related to overall takeover activity, the decline in takeover activity does not result in fewer performance-enhancing restructurings following performance declines. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. JEL classification. G32; G34.
引用
收藏
页码:391 / 424
页数:34
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