A reanalysis of the personal/impersonal distinction in moral psychology research

被引:96
作者
McGuire, Jonathan [1 ]
Langdon, Robyn [1 ]
Coltheart, Max [1 ]
Mackenzie, Catriona [2 ]
机构
[1] Macquarie Univ, Macquarie Ctr Cognit Sci, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia
[2] Macquarie Univ, Dept Philosophy, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia
关键词
Moral psychology; Personal dilemma; Impersonal dilemma; Moral judgement; Moral dilemma; JUDGMENT; DAMAGE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jesp.2009.01.002
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
Greene and colleagues [Greene, J., Sommerville, B. R., Nystrom, L. E., Darley,J. M.,&Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293, 2105-2108.] have revealed an apparent distinction in folk psychology between 'up close and personal' and 'impersonal' moral dilemmas. Reasoning about these types of dilemmas is purportedly supported by partially dissociable neural systems. However, further investigation of the data supporting this hypothesis indicated that only a small number of stimuli used by Greene et al. are driving the effect originally found. Implications of the apparent distinction initially reported and of other research in the domain of moral psychology are discussed. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:577 / 580
页数:4
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