Can Bayesian confirmation measures be useful for rough set decision rules?

被引:105
作者
Greco, S
Pawlak, Z
Slowinski, R
机构
[1] Univ Catania, Fac Econ, I-95129 Catania, Italy
[2] Polish Acad Sci, Inst Theoret & Appl Informat, PL-44100 Gliwice, Poland
[3] Warsaw Sch Informat Technol, PL-01447 Warsaw, Poland
[4] Poznan Univ Tech, Inst Comp Sci, PL-60965 Poznan, Poland
[5] Polish Acad Sci, Syst Res Inst, PL-01447 Warsaw, Poland
关键词
confirmation measures; Bayes' theorem; rough sets; decision rules; decision algorithm; monotonicity property;
D O I
10.1016/j.engappai.2004.04.008
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Bayesian confirmation theory considers a variety of non-equivalent confirmation measures which say in what degree a piece of evidence confirms a hypothesis. In this paper, we apply some well-known confirmation measures within the rough set approach to discovering relationships in data in terms of decision rules. Moreover, we discuss some interesting properties of these confirmation measures and we propose a new property of monotonicity that is particularly relevant within rough set approach. The main result of this paper states that only two from among confirmation measures considered in the literature have the desirable properties from the viewpoint of the rough set approach. Moreover, we clarify relationships between logical implications and decision rules, and we compare the confirmation measures to several related measures, like independence (dependence) of logical formulas, interestingness measures in data mining and Bayesian solutions of raven's paradox. (C) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:345 / 361
页数:17
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