Some stylized facts on organization and its evolution

被引:31
作者
Colombo, MG
Delmastro, M
机构
[1] Univ Pavia, I-27100 Pavia, Italy
[2] Politecn Milan, CIRET, Dipartimento Econ & Prod, I-20133 Milan, Italy
[3] Univ Warwick, Warwick, England
关键词
firm's organizational structure; hierarchy; decision-making allocation;
D O I
10.1016/S0167-2681(99)00067-0
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
There is a striking difference between the large number of theoretical papers on firm organization and the lack of quantitative empirical evidence. If on the one side economists are increasingly concerned with organization of firms, on the other side organization still remains an ambiguous concept, hardly analyzed empirically. In this paper, we develop a new empirical methodology based upon business history and previous theoretical works which allows us to describe (some aspects of) the organization of firms in quantitative terms. This approach is instrumental to analyzing the hierarchical structure and the allocation of decision-making activities in a sample composed of 438 Italian metalworking plants. We also study the dynamics of firm organization in the period 1975-1997. The results of the analysis show that the (static) choice of the organizational form crucially relies upon the 'loss of control phenomenon'. They also illustrate that the dynamics of hierarchical structure follows an inertial process, characterized by incremental adjustments. Lastly, both the organization of firms and, more interestingly, its evolution differ from one category of firms to another depending crucially on firm size. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D23; L22.
引用
收藏
页码:255 / 274
页数:20
相关论文
共 31 条
[1]   SOME IMPLICATIONS OF GROWTH FOR ORGANIZATIONAL FORM AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE [J].
AGHION, P ;
TIROLE, J .
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1995, 39 (3-4) :440-455
[2]   Formal and real authority in organizations [J].
Aghion, P ;
Tirole, J .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1997, 105 (01) :1-29
[3]  
[Anonymous], 1962, STRATEGY STRUCTURE
[4]  
Baharami H., 1992, CALIFORNIA MANAGEMEN, V34, P33
[5]   THE INTERNAL ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM - EVIDENCE FROM PERSONNEL DATA [J].
BAKER, G ;
GIBBS, M ;
HOLMSTROM, B .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1994, 109 (04) :881-919
[6]   THE FIRM AS A COMMUNICATION-NETWORK [J].
BOLTON, P ;
DEWATRIPONT, M .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1994, 109 (04) :809-839
[7]   SUPERVISION, LOSS OF CONTROL, AND OPTIMUM SIZE OF FIRM [J].
CALVO, GA ;
WELLISZ, S .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1978, 86 (05) :943-952
[8]   HIERARCHY, ABILITY, AND INCOME-DISTRIBUTION [J].
CALVO, GA ;
WELLISZ, S .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1979, 87 (05) :991-1010
[9]  
Chandler AlfredD., 1977, VISIBLE HAND
[10]  
DRUCKER PF, 1988, HARVARD BUSINESS JAN, P45