The truth-conditional relevance of de re modes of presentation: A reply to Grimberg

被引：1

作者：

Bezuidenhout, A

机构：

[1] Department of Philosophy, University of South Carolina, Columbia

来源：

MIND & LANGUAGE | 1996年 / 11卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00055.x

中图分类号：

H0 [语言学];

学科分类号：

030303 ; 0501 ; 050102 ;

摘要：

Grimberg identifies four arguments which she alleges are used in my paper 'pragmatics and Singular Reference' (Bezuidenhout, 1996a) in order to establish the truth-conditional relevance of de re modes of presentation. In fact, only one of these, properly understood, is an argument which I would endorse. However, I do plead guilty to having used examples with features which misleadingly suggest that I endorse these various arguments. It is an easy matter to construct examples free from these defects, which is what I attempt to do.

引用

页码：427 / 432

页数：6

共 8 条

[1] Pragmatics and singular reference [J].