Lobster and groundfish management in the Gulf of Maine: A rational choice perspective

Many of the world's most important fisheries are in a state of crisis. The Maine lobster industry is one of the very few exceptions, with catches at an all time high. Much of the success of this fishery stems from effective conservation legislation, passed largely through the long-term lobbying activities of powerful factions within the industry itself. In stark contrast is the Maine groundfishery, where stocks and catches have never been so low. This industry has had to deal with a top-down management system that has given it little incentive to conserve and has made it virtually impossible to get rules the industry considers effective. They have responded by using a roving bandit strategy. From the perspective of rational choice theory, the basic difference is that the lobster industry has been able to organize politically to get legislation to solve its communal action dilemma, while the groundfishing industry, like most fishing industries, has not. This paper explores the biological, technical, economic, social, and political factors underlying the differential ability of these two industries to develop effective conservation legislation. These data contribute to answering one of the most important questions facing resource management at present-namely, under what conditions will resource users develop rules to sustain the resources on which their livelihood depends?