Complexity, flexibility, and the make-or-buy decision

被引：85

作者：

Tadelis, S ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2002年 / 92卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/000282802320191750

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：433 / 437

页数：5

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