Determinants of individual-firm markup in Japan: Market concentration, market share, and FTC regulations

被引:6
作者
Ariga, K
Ohkusa, Y
Nishimura, KG
机构
[1] Kyoto Univ, Inst Ecol Res, Sakyo Ku, Kyoto 6068501, Japan
[2] Osaka Univ, Inst Social & Econ Res, Suita, Osaka 565, Japan
[3] Univ Tokyo, Fac Econ, Tokyo, Japan
关键词
D O I
10.1006/jjie.1999.0430
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper estimates individual firm level markup for more than 400 major manufacturing firms in Japan. Our estimates suggest the presence of significant market power for most of these firms, due not only to market concentration bur also to the firms' own market shares, as well as advertizing and sales promotion efforts. The paper then goes on to assess systematically the impact on estimated markups of regulatory measures taken by the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) of the Japanese Government. We find that non-punitive FTC activities are directed toward the right targets and are reasonably effective, whereas injunctions, the strongest measure endowed to the FTC, has essentially no effect on the markups of firms in our sample. (C) 1999 Academic Press. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: L13, L41.
引用
收藏
页码:424 / 450
页数:27
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