Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction

被引：202

作者：

Petrosjan, L

Zaccour, G

机构：

[1] GERAD, Montreal, PQ H3T 2A7, Canada

[2] Ecole Hautes Etud Commerciales, Montreal, PQ H3T 2A7, Canada

[3] St Petersburg State Univ, Ctr Game Theory, St Petersburg, Russia

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL | 2003年 / 27卷 / 03期

基金：

加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;

关键词：

dynamic games; Shapley value; environmental management; dynamic programming; time-consistency;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1889(01)00053-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study the problem of allocation over time of total cost incurred by countries in a cooperative game of pollution reduction. We compute the characteristic function for all possible coalitions and apply the Shapley value to determine a fair distribution of the total cooperative cost among players. We design a mechanism for allocation over time of total individual cost so that the initial agreement remains valid for the whole duration of the game. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：381 / 398

页数：18

共 15 条

[1]

[Anonymous], ANN INT SOC DYN GAME

[2]

Bahn O, 1998, ENVIRON MODEL ASSESS, V3, P107, DOI DOI 10.1023/A:1019062806256

[3] INTERNATIONAL POLLUTION-CONTROL - COOPERATIVE VERSUS NONCOOPERATIVE STRATEGIES [J].