A marginalistic value for monotonic set games

被引：23

作者：

Aarts, H ^{[1
]}

Hoede, K ^{[1
]}

Funaki, Y ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV TOKYO, FAC ECON, ASAKA, SAITAMA 351, JAPAN

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 1997年 / 26卷 / 01期

关键词：

cooperative game; set game; value; Shapley value; monotonicity; marginal contribution;

D O I：

10.1007/BF01262515

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper we characterize a value, called a marginalistic value, for monotonic set games, which can be considered to be the analog of the Shapley value for TU-games. For this characterization we use a modification of the strong monotonicity axiom of Young, but the proof is rather different from his.

引用

页码：97 / 111

页数：15