Costly information acquisition: Experimental analysis of a boundedly rational model

被引:261
作者
Gabaix, Xavier
Laibson, David
Moloche, Guillermo
Weinberg, Stephen
机构
[1] MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
[2] Harvard Univ, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/aer.96.4.1043
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The directed cognition model assumes that agents use partially myopic option-value calculations to select their next cognitive operation. The current paper tests this model by studying information acquisition in two experiments. In the first experiment, information acquisition has an explicit financial cost. In the second experiment, information acquisition is costly because time is scarce. The directed cognition model successfully predicts aggregate information acquisition patterns in these experiments. When the directed cognition model and the fully rational model make demonstrably different predictions, the directed cognition model better matches the laboratory evidence.
引用
收藏
页码:1043 / 1068
页数:26
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