Jump bidding in takeover auctions

被引：12

作者：

Dodonova, Anna ^{[1
]}

Khoroshilov, Yuri ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Ottawa, Sch Management, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5, Canada

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2006年 / 92卷 / 03期

关键词：

auction; takeover;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2006.03.012

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper shows that the target's ability to reject the highest offer makes bidders unwilling to reveal their private signals. In particular, such ability precludes bidders from using jump bidding to signal their high values to deter competition. This paper appeals for an alternative explanation of the existence of jump bidding in takeover auctions. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.

引用

页码：339 / 341

页数：3

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