Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures

被引：37

作者：

Arifovic, Jasmina ^{[1
]}

Jiang, Janet Hua ^{[2
]}

Xu, Yiping ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Simon Fraser Univ, Burnaby, BC V5A 1S6, Canada

[2] Bank Canada, Ottawa, ON K1A 0G9, Canada

[3] Univ Int Business & Econ, Beijing, Peoples R China

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL | 2013年 / 37卷 / 12期

关键词：

Bank runs; Experimental studies; Evolutionary algorithm; Coordination games; EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION; STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY; GLOBAL GAMES; INFORMATION; PANICS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jedc.2013.06.016

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We investigate how coordination requirement, measured by the coordination parameter, affects the occurrence of miscoordination-based bank runs in controlled laboratory environments. We identify an indeterminacy region of the coordination parameter such that games with the parameter within the region have varying coordination outcomes and exhibit persistent path dependence. Experimental economies with the parameter above (below) the region stay close or converge to the run (non-run) equilibrium. Switches between the two equilibria occur even with fixed economic fundamentals. The experimental results are well accounted for by a version of the evolutionary algorithm that uses experimentation rates estimated from the experimental data. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：2446 / 2465

页数：20

共 33 条

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