Synergies in wireless telephony: Evidence from the broadband PCS auctions

被引:39
作者
Ausubel, LM
Cramton, P
McAfee, RP
McMillan, J
机构
[1] UNIV TEXAS, DEPT ECON, AUSTIN, TX 78712 USA
[2] UNIV CALIF SAN DIEGO, SCH INT RELAT & PACIFIC STUDIES, LA JOLLA, CA 92093 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00497.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We examine bid data from the first two broadband PCS spectrum auctions for evidence of value synergies. First, toe estimate a benchmark regression for the determinants of final auction prices. Then, we include variables reflecting the extent to which bidders ultimately won or already owned the adjacent wireless properties. Consistent with geographic synergies il I an ascending-bid auction, pl ices were higher when I the highest losing bidder had adjacent licenses. The footprints of winning bidders suggest that they were often successful in realizing these synergies.
引用
收藏
页码:497 / 527
页数:31
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