The revelation and delegation principles in common agency games

被引：98

作者：

Martimort, D

Stole, L

机构：

[1] Université des Sciences Sociales, Toulouse

[2] University of Chicago, IL

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 2002年 / 70卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/1468-0262.t01-1-00345

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：1659 / 1673

页数：15

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