Stable partnerships, matching, and local public goods

被引:6
作者
Clark, S
Kanbur, R
机构
[1] Univ Edinburgh, Dept Econ, Edinburgh EH8 9JY, Midlothian, Scotland
[2] Cornell Univ, Dept Appl Econ & Management, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
关键词
matching; sorting; local public goods; heterogeneity of tastes;
D O I
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2003.10.002
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In the presence of local public goods differences in tastes are an important determinant of the way in which partnerships are formed. Heterogeneity in tastes for private vs, public goods produces a tendency to positive assortment and partnerships of couples with similar tastes; heterogeneity in tastes for different public goods brings about partnerships of couples with similar tastes only if there is a significant overlap in the distribution of tastes of the two groups to be matched. We show that with two public goods we may get negative assortment, pure positive assortment being only one of many possibilities. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:905 / 925
页数:21
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