External recruitments and firm performance

被引：9

作者：

Martins, Pedro

Lima, Francisco ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ London Queen Mary Coll, Sch Business & Management, London, England

[2] IZA, Bonn, Germany

[3] CEG IST, Lisbon, Portugal

[4] Inst Super Tecn, Dept Engn & Management, Lisbon, Portugal

[5] Inst Super Tecn, CEG, IST, Lisbon, Portugal

来源：

APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2006年 / 13卷 / 14期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1080/13504850500426129

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In the context of tournament theory, and drawing on a panel data set of several firms and their employees, evidence is presented of a negative relationship between the share of external recruitments for top management positions and firm productivity.

引用

页码：911 / 915

页数：5

共 11 条

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