Subsidizing cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers

被引：91

作者：

Hinloopen, J

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, Fac. of Technol., Plcy. and Mgmt., Technical University Delft, 2600 GB Delft

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR NATIONALOKONOMIE | 1997年 / 66卷 / 02期

关键词：

research and development; subsidies; cooperation; Cournot duopoly; spillovers;

D O I：

10.1007/BF01234404

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Comparing the effect on private R&D investments of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D with that of providing R&D subsidies reveals that in general the latter policy is more effective than the former in promoting R&D activity. Analyzing the implementation of both policies simultaneously reveals that subsidizing cooperative and noncooperative R&D leads to the same market outcome. The preferred R&D-stimulating policy is to subsidize optimally an agreement according to which firms only share the outcomes of their independent research.

引用

页码：151 / 175

页数：25

共 23 条

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