Career concerns and multitasking local bureaucrats: Evidence of a target-based performance evaluation system in China

被引:429
作者
Chen, Yvonne Jie [1 ]
Li, Pei [2 ,3 ]
Lu, Yi [4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Natl Univ Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew Sch Publ Policy, 469C Bukit Timah Rd, Singapore 259772, Singapore
[2] Xiamen Univ, Dept Publ Finance, Xiamen 361005, Peoples R China
[3] Xiamen Univ, Wang Yanan Inst Studies Econ, Xiamen 361005, Peoples R China
[4] Tsinghua Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China
[5] Natl Univ Singapore, Sch Econ, Singapore 117570, Singapore
关键词
Target-based performance evaluation; Air pollution; Economic growth; Multitasking agency problem; China; ENVIRONMENTAL-REGULATION; ECONOMIC-GROWTH; AIR-POLLUTION; POLICY; GOVERNMENT; INCENTIVES; IMPACT; ACCOUNTABILITY; POLITICIANS; MORTALITY;
D O I
10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.02.001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper examines whether a target-based performance evaluation system can properly motivate local bureaucrats to implement an environmental regulation policy at the cost of slow economic growth. In late 2005, the Chinese central government made cutting sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions the main performance evaluation criterion for prefectural city mayors and Party secretaries. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we find that the performance evaluation system caused a significant decrease in SO2 emissions, as well as in the GDP growth rate. Our mechanism analyses further corroborate that local bureaucrats in Two Control Zone cities were willing to trade off GDP growth to achieve the more stringent emissions reductions goal. Our findings contribute to the understanding of multitasking agency problems for government agents.
引用
收藏
页码:84 / 101
页数:18
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