Theorizing Regulatory Intermediaries: The RIT Model

被引：204

作者：

Abbott, Kenneth W. ^{[1
]}

Levi-faur, David ^{[2
,3
]}

Snidal, Duncan ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Arizona State Univ, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA

[2] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Federmann Sch Publ Policy & Govt, Jerusalem, Israel

[3] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Dept Polit Sci, Jerusalem, Israel

[4] Univ Oxford, Nuffield Coll, Int Relat, Oxford, England

来源：

ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE | 2017年 / 670卷 / 01期

关键词：

intermediaries; rule-takers; rule-makers; regulation; regulatory governance; orchestration; capture; PRIVATE REGULATION; GLOBAL GOVERNANCE; STANDARDS; ACCOUNTABILITY; NETWORKS;

D O I：

10.1177/0002716216688272

中图分类号：

D0 [政治学、政治理论];

学科分类号：

0302 ; 030201 ;

摘要：

Regulation is typically conceived as a two-party relationship between a rule-maker or regulator (R) and a rule-taker or target (T). We set out an agenda for the study of regulation as a three- (or more) party relationship, with intermediaries (I) at the center of the analysis. Intermediaries play major and varied roles in regulation, from providing expertise and feedback to facilitating implementation, from monitoring the behavior of regulatory targets to building communities of assurance and trust. After developing the basic regulator-intermediary-target (RIT) model, we discuss important extensions and variations of the model. We then discuss the varieties of regulatory capture that may appear where intermediaries are involved.

引用

页码：14 / 35

页数：22

共 50 条

[1] International regulation without international government: Improving IO performance through orchestration [J].