On the complex relation between cognitive developmental research and children's science curricula

My earlier article (Metz, 1995) identified several assumptions about elementary school children's scientific reasoning abilities that have frequently been used for the purpose of framing ''developmentally appropriate'' science curricula. That article traced the origin of those assumptions to an interpretation of a segment of Piaget's writings and then critiqued those assumptions of the basis of Piaget's corpus, as well as the contemporary cognitive developmental research literature. Given that developmental research constituted the primary base on which I critiqued these assumptions and formulated alternative recommendations, I am surprised by Deanna Kuhn's (1997) contention that the article could be read as suggesting that the developmental literature has ''failed'' science educators and that they would be advised to look elsewhere to inform their curricular design. Nevertheless, I do consider the relation between cognitive developmental research, as embodied in the contemporary research tradition, and children's science curricula as fundamentally complex. This essay examines three interrelated characteristics of the cognitive developmental research tradition that contribute to the complexity of this relationship: (a) its tendency to attribute shortcomings in performance to the child's stage, with the assumption that these shortcomings will disappear with sufficient advancement of cognitive development; (b) the frequent confounding of weak knowledge with developmentally based cognitive deficiencies; and (c) the emphasis of robust stage-based constraints on children's thinking, to the neglect of variability and change.