A tax on tax revenue: The incentive effects of equalizing transfers: Evidence from Germany

被引：86

作者：

Baretti, C ^{[1
]}

Huber, B

Lichtblau, K

机构：

[1] Ifo Inst, Munich, Germany

[2] Univ Munich, Dept Econ, D-80539 Munich, Germany

[3] IW Inst Deutschen, Cologne, Germany

来源：

INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE | 2002年 / 9卷 / 06期

关键词：

fiscal federalism; intergovernmental transfers; interstate equalization;

D O I：

10.1023/A:1020925812428

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Several recent studies suggest that equalizing transfers in a federal system may distort the tax policy decisions of states. We study this issue for the German federal fiscal system, In a simple theoretical model, we first identify a substitution effect and an income effect of equalizing transfers. Our main hypothesis is that both effects should tend to reduce tax revenue of German states. We perform various empirical tests which confirm this hypothesis.

引用

页码：631 / 649

页数：19

共 16 条

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