On revenue and welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes in two-sided markets

被引：18

作者：

Kind, Hans Jarle ^{[2
]}

Koethenbuerger, Marko ^{[1
]}

Schjelderup, Guttorm ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Copenhagen, Dept Econ, DK-1455 Copenhagen, Denmark

[2] Norwegian Sch Econ & Business Adm, N-5035 Bergen, Norway

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2009年 / 104卷 / 02期

关键词：

Ad valorem taxes; Unit taxes; Two-sided markets; Revenue-dominance; Welfare-dominance; Monopoly; TAXATION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2009.04.010

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A benchmark result in public economics is that it is possible to increase both tax revenue and welfare by making a monopoly subject to ad valorem taxes rather than unit taxes. We show that such revenue and welfare dominance does not hold in two-sided markets. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：86 / 88

页数：3

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