Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Documents

被引:3
作者
Raso, Connor N. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Yale Univ, Sch Law, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
[2] Stanford Univ, Dept Polit Sci, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
关键词
RULES; RULEMAKING; MEAD;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
This Note examines whether U.S. regulatory agencies frequently use guidance documents to issue policy decisions, avoiding the notice and comment process and other procedures normally required to issue rules. Legal scholars and recent presidential administrations both have debated this issue. This Note uses newly available data to conduct the first large-scale analysis of whether agencies actually abuse guidance. The Note investigates whether agency leaders: (1) issue guidance strategically; (2) use guidance to implement ideological policies; or (3) promulgate guidance on a large scale. The Note reports negative answers to these questions, suggesting that agencies do not frequently use guidance documents to avoid the rulemaking process.
引用
收藏
页码:782 / 824
页数:43
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