Multilateral subsidy games

被引：18

作者：

Leahy, Dermot ^{[2
]}

Neary, J. Peter ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Oxford, Dept Econ, Oxford OX1 3UQ, England

[2] Natl Univ Ireland, Dept Econ, Maynooth, Kildare, Ireland

来源：

ECONOMIC THEORY | 2009年 / 41卷 / 01期

基金：

爱尔兰科学基金会;

关键词：

Industrial policy; Investment subsidies; Subsidy wars; Strategic trade policy; R&D spillovers; Oligopoly; RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT; OLIGOPOLISTIC INDUSTRIES; DEVELOPMENT POLICY; STRATEGIC TRADE; COMPETITION; RIVALRY; MARKET; UNION;

D O I：

10.1007/s00199-008-0384-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper examines the rationale for multilateral agreements to limit investment subsidies. The welfare ranking of symmetric multilateral subsidy games is shown to depend on whether or not investment levels are "friendly", raising rival profits in total, and/or strategic complements, raising rival profits at the margin. In both Cournot and Bertrand competition, when spillovers are low and competition is intense (because goods are close substitutes), national-welfare-maximizing governments over-subsidize investment, and banning subsidies would improve welfare. When spillovers are high, national governments under-subsidize from a global welfare perspective, but the subsidy game is welfare superior to non-intervention.

引用

页码：41 / 66

页数：26

共 22 条

[1]

[Anonymous], EUROPEAN EC EC PAPER

[2]

[Anonymous], 2001, J INT TRADE EC DEV

[3] THE SENSITIVITY OF STRATEGIC AND CORRECTIVE RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN OLIGOPOLISTIC INDUSTRIES [J].