Approval voting: three examples

被引：20

作者：

De Sinopoli, Francesco

Dutta, Bhaskar

Laslier, Jean-Francois

机构：

[1] Ecole Polytech, F-75005 Paris, France

[2] Univ Carlos III Madrid, Dept Econ, Madrid 28903, Spain

[3] Univ Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 2006年 / 35卷 / 01期

关键词：

approval voting; sophisticated voting; sincere voting; perfect equilibrium; stable set;

D O I：

10.1007/s00182-006-0053-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper we discuss three examples of approval voting games. The first one illustrates that a stronger solution concept than perfection is needed for a strategic analysis of this type of games. The second example shows that sophisticated voting can imply that the Condorcet winner gets no vote. The third example shows the possibility of insincere voting being a stable equilibrium.

引用

页码：27 / 38

页数：12

共 14 条

[1] APPROVAL VOTING [J].